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Abstract 
The contract-farming supply chain model consisting of 
one risk-neutral agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer 
with fairness concerns is proposed under stochastic yield. 
The fair reference framework is established according 
to Nash bargaining game. The impact on the optimal 
decision of contract-farming supply chain by the risk-
averse farmer’s fairness concerns. The numerical study 
illustrates the application of the model, and analyze some 
parameter influencing the optimal decision between one 
risk-neutral agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer with 
fairness concerns.   
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, according to “speeding up the development 
of ‘thirty five-years plan’ modern agriculture by turning 
the development pattern and adjusting the structures 
of agriculture economics”, Ke-Ming Qian, the chief 
economist of ministry of agriculture, admitted that 
because of “good policy , hard work, and the good 
weather”, our continuous-increasing agricultural product 
plays an important role in China’s social and economic 
stability development in the past. But as the economy 
enters the new normal, internal and external environment 
for the development of agriculture in our country is 
undergoing profound changes, therefore our country 
should accelerate the transformation and upgrading of 
agriculture, promoting agricultural industrialization. 
So how to realize the agricultural industrialization 
development? Learning from agricultural development 
experience at home and abroad, it’s not difficult to 
find contract-farming is the best choice for promoting 
agricultural industrialization. Contract-farming refers to 
an agricultural management pattern, the farmer signs a 
legally binding contract with the company or intermediary 
organizations in the process of production and operation, 
thus to determine the relationship between the powers and 
obligations of both sides, farmers organize production, 
company or intermediary organizations purchase products 
manufactured by farmers both according to the contract 
(Liu, 2003). Since the 1980s of the last century, contract-
farming has showed its unique advantages in some aspects, 
such as solving “the contradiction between small-scale 
production and big market”, reducing farmers’ decision-
making blindness, reducing operation cost and risk of the 
industrialization of agriculture and increasing farmers’ 
income, etc.. But it also exposed some problems, such as 
the lower order execution rate, for this purpose, domestic 
and foreign scholars apply enterprise organization theory, 
contract theory, game theory and transaction cost theory 
doing research on high default rates to explore the method 
of solving the problem of high default rates.
1. LITERATURE
For the problem of lower order execution rate in the 
process of contract-farming supply chain, many scholars 
do researches with enterprise organization theory, contract 
theory, game theory, transaction cost theory, etc.. For 
examples, foreign scholar Bogetoft and Olesen (2002) 
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think that contract-farming contract must be designed 
under the premise of taking coordination, motivation and 
transaction cost into consideration thoroughly. Burer et 
al. (2008) has studied on the coordination mechanism 
of contract-farming supply chain. Zylbersztajn et al. 
(2008) propose to adopt price strategy to improve the 
order execution rate. Kazaz and Webster (2005) studied 
production decision of the agricultural-industrialization 
organization with the price undering the influence of 
random output. In the domestic, Guo’s empirical study 
(2006) shows that “guaranteed acquisition and going-rate-
pricing” can obviously increase the order execution rate, it 
also shows that adding specialized input requirements and 
incentive measures to the provisions has the same work. 
Zhao and Wu (2009) studied the revenue sharing contract 
mechanism of agricultural products supplies chain under 
the condition of random output and demand. Ye (2011) 
studied the contract-farming supply chain coordination 
contract mechanism. However, these research reckons 
without fairness concerns, so the contract performance 
rate is always low.
In the past 20 years, behavioral economics research 
shows that people don’t only care their own benefit but 
also care other’s interest (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 
1993). A large number of experiments show that no matter 
what supplier or retailer will be willing to give up their 
marginal income to achieve the more fair consequence 
because of fairness concerns (Kumar, 1996). The farmer 
in the contract-farming exists fairness concerns beyond 
all questions. 
Cui et al. (2007) introduce fairness concerns to 
newsboy background to study the impact on supply chain 
contract. Loch and Wu (2008) produce concise fairness 
concerns utility form to research the problem of supply 
chain performance. Du et al. (2013) concerns the fair 
reference point of retailer is Nash bargaining solution 
in the supply chain, reflecting fair relatively but without 
agricultural characteristic. In this paper, the contract-
farming supply chain model consisting of one risk-neutral 
agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer with fairness 
concerns is proposed under stochastic yield, the fair 
reference point is Nash bargaining solution. 
In conclusion, there is few research study the optimal 
decision of contract-farming supply chain from the 
perspective of fairness concerns. Existing research only 
take the absolutely fair into account, but actually fair is 
relative, so the view of the fairness frame of reference is 
worth thinking deeply. The fair reference framework is 
established according to Nash bargaining game. The impact 
on the optimal decision of contract-farming supply chain by 
the risk-averse farmer’s fairness concerns in this paper.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Agricultural products have short life cycles, as well as 
corrosive uncertainty output characteristics, the contract-
farming supply chain model consisting of one risk-neutral 
agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer with fairness 
concerns is proposed under stochastic yield in this paper.
Farmers response for the production of agricultural 
products, the company is responsible for processing and 
marketing. Before the start of production, the company 
and farmers signed a mutually agreed to acquire orders in 
order to ensure market demand, the order specified: At the 
end of the production company acquire all the agricultural 
production of farmers at a certain price. 
Farmers make the decision of the optimal input 
according to their own financial situation and the market 
demand and climatic conditions when agricultural 
production season coming. In the actual production 
process of agricultural products also affected by 
uncontrollable factors such as weather, pests and other 
natural disasters, there are uncontrollable production 
risks. The company makes the decision of order price 
according to the agricultural inputs as well as the retail 
market price. In the end the agribusiness purchase 
all the agricultural production from the farmer in the 
contract according to the order price. After the adoption 
of processing (cleaning, packaging) process, sale 
agricultural products according to the retail market price, 
and retailer market price is impacted with the random 
output of agricultural production. At this point, “Company 
+ Farmers” contract-farming supply chain complete a 
whole proceeding cycle.
In this paper, we consider contract-farming supply 
chain consisting of a farmer and a company, and the 
farmer is risk-averse while the company is risk-neutral. 
Meanwhile, taking the impact of weather, climate, natural 
disasters and other objective criteria into account, we 
assume that the agricultural output is random. For ease 
of description, the symbol is defined as follows: Q is 
the number of inputs of farmers in decision-making, 
Meanwhile, we assume Qd and Qu denote the number of input under normal circumstances and fairness concerns 
circumstances respectively. c represents the farmer’s 
effort cost coefficient, and the agricultural production 
costs is related to the number of input Q, we assume that 
the production cost function is  ( ) 21=
2
C Q cQ , is strictly 
monotonically increasing function of the number of 
inputs, including the production of agricultural products 
takes time, energy, etc.. Meanwhile we assume that ω is 
the contract decided by the company. The agricultural 
productivity μ is a non-negative random variables, 
suppose the distribution function and the density function, 
respectively F(.) and f(.). p is the retail market prices of 
agricultural products which is effected by the agricultural 
productivity μ, we can make it p=a-b(μQ). Farmer and the 
company’s earnings are πF and πE. By the way, we assume 
that UF and UE represent farmer and company’s utility 
respectively.
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Signing contract orders can ensure the stable supply of 
agricultural products, and the residual value of agricultural 
products is very low in the ending of sales, so out of the 
loss of agricultural income and final residual value will not 
be considered. Because farmers face many uncertainties, 
social systems, cultural constraints and poverty, most 
of them are risk aversion and fairness concerns. Our 
farmers are mostly very small scale economic entity, and 
most farmers rely on very little land resources for simple 
reproduction, most farmer’s income is low, this determines 
the characteristics of the risk aversion of households and 
fairness concerns. So we assume the farmer belongs to 
risk-aversion and fairness concerns, while the company 
belongs to risk-neutral and fairness-neutral. 
The information above is common knowledge for the 
company and farmer.
3 .  T H E  O P T I M A L  D E C I S I O N  O F 
C O N T R A C T - F A R M I N G  U N D E R 
DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING 
SITUATION
According to the description of the problem and the basic 
assumptions, the company and farmer’s decision variables 
are respectively order price ω and the number of input 
Q. The company acquired all agricultural production 
of farmers according to the order price in the end of 
production. The farmer’s random revenue function is:
    ( ) 21,
2F
Q Q cQω ωµπ = − . (1)
At this time, the company’s revenue function:
  πE(Q, ω)=(p-ω)μQ . (2)
However, in real life, the farmers tend to be risk 
averse, so farmers not only need to consider expected 
revenue but also need to consider the income risk when he 
decides the number of agricultural input. In this paper, we 
measure the degree of risk by CVaR, because the average 
income measured by CVaR lower than η quantile is that 
the risk-averse farmer really cares about. According to 
the generalized definition of CVaR, the decision of inputs 
number of objective function of farmer with risk-aversion 
characteristics can be described as:
 
( ) ( )( )1 min ,0maxF F
v
Q v E Q vCVaRη π πη∈
         
= + − .
(3)
Among them, v represents the η quantile of the random 
variables μ. E denotes the expected value of the decision 
variables and η∈(0,1] means the degree of risk-aversion 
(the less is η, the more scared is decision-maker ).
Take (1) into (3) and then Simultaneous (2), solve the 
revenue function for the company and risk-averse farmers 
with the methods of stackelberg game, we can get the 
optimal decision-making of risk-neutral company and 
risk-aversion farmer in the decentralized decision-making 
problems.
Theorem 1: In the decentralized decision-making 
problems, risk-averse households and companies make 
their optimal decision with stackelberg game from the 
perspective of maximizing their own interests. The 
optimal order price decided by company is
 
( )( ) ( )
1
0
2
0 0 02 2
Fd A
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c b f d f dη
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µ η µ µ µ µ µ
ω
µ
−
∗ =
+ ∫ ∫
. (4)
While the optimal number of input decided by farmer 
is
 ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1
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We take the optimal number of input Q*d and optimal 
order price ω*d into (3), then we get the optimal utility of 
risk-averse farmer in the decentralized situation
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Similarly, the optimal utility of the company in the 
decentralized situation is
 ( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
1
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0 0
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f d
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c b f d f d
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∫
∫ ∫
 (7)
4. THE OPTIMAL DECISION OF SUPPLY 
CHAIN WITH FAIRNESS CONCERNS
4.1 Nash Fairness Concerns Consultative 
Framework
We assume that the solution of Nash bargaining model is 
 ( ) ( ){ }, ,CVaR F EQ Qη ω ωπ π  ， , which is decision-makers 
perceiving fairness reference solution. Meanwhile, we 
assume that the income differences will affect utility, so 
the utility function of risk-averse farmer and risk-neutral 
company is as follows
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , ,CVaRF F F F FQ Q QU CVaR CVaRη η ηω ω ωπ λ π π= + −          
 (8)
  UE=πE+λE(πE - π
_
E). (9)
W h e r e  λ F ,  λ E  d e n o t e s  t h e  f a i r  c o n c e r n 
c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  f a r m e r  a n d  c o m p a n y,  λ F > 0 , 
λE>0;  ( ) ( ), ,CVaR F EQ Qη ω ωπ π  ，  is the solution that 
both sides believe that their own fair, that the Equity 
Solutions. It is clear that 
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     ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,CVaR F EQ Q Qη ω ω π ωπ π+ =  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,EQ Q QCVaRη ω ω π ωπ+ =
,
     
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,CVaR F EQ Q Qη ω ω π ωπ π+ =  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,EQ Q QCVaRη ω ω π ωπ+ = .
According to the axiomatic definition of Nash 
bargaining game solution, Nash solution is the solution of 
the model as follows
 
( ) ( )CVaR , , ,
max
F E
F E
Q Q
U U
η π πω ω  
 ( ) ( ) ( ). . , , ,Es t Q Q QCVaRη ω ω π ωπ+ =
 , 0F EU U > .
 (10)
It is easy to get the solution as follows
 ( ) ( )1, ,
2CVaR
F
F
F E
Q Qη ω π ω
λπ
λ λ
+
=   + +
 ( ) 1,
2
E
E
F E
Q ω πλπ λ λ
+
=
+ +
, (11)
   
 ( ) ( )1, ,
2CVaR
F
F
F E
Q Qη ω π ω
λπ
λ
+
=   +
 ( ) 1,
2
E
E
F E
Q ω πλπ λ
+
=
+
. (12)
Take the Nash negotiation fairness solution as the 
reference to judge the fairness, because this reference 
considers the strength and contribution of both sides. 
Perception is a relatively fair and in line with the actual 
situation, overcome the concerns of equity that existed in 
the supply chain study considering only absolutely fair.
4.2 The Optimal Decision of the Fairness 
Concerns Farmer
According to the assumption, we only consider the risk-
averse farmer cares about fairness concerns, while the 
company is fair-neutral, in other words λF=λ>0, λE=0, at 
this time fair reference solution for risk-averse farmers is
  ( ) ( )1, ,
2CVaR F
Q Qη
λ
ω π ω
λπ
+
=   +
. (13)
Theorem 2. When the risk-averse farmer concerns 
fairness, In order to make the supply chain to maximize 
the utility of both parties, the farmer and company make 
the optimal decision by Stackelberg game. The optimal 
order price decided by the company is
 ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2 2
0 0 0 0
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
u
l ac ab ab ab l
c b bl l lb
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
µ µ µ µ δ
ω
µ µ µ µ µ µ δ
∗
 + + + + + =
+ + + + + +
 (14)
While the optimal number of input decided by the 
farmer is
   
 ( )
( )
0
2 2
0
2
2 2
u u
u
l a
c b
Q
λ
λ
µω ω
µ δ
∗ ∗
∗ − −=
+ +
. (15)
5. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to observe the impact on the optimal decision 
of both sides of the contract-farming supply chain by the 
degree of risk-averse and fairness concerns of the farmer, 
we take the numerical analysis as follows. And we assume 
the related reference as follows
              a=10, b=2, c=1.8, A=1, μ U(0,A).
From figure 1, we observe that the optimal order price 
ω*u when λ=0.8 is higher than the optimal order price ω
*
d 
without fairness concerns through Stackelberg game. It 
shows that the farmer’s fairness concerns will force the 
company to enhance the order price to achieve the relative 
fair for the farmer. Meanwhile, Figure 1 shows that 
weather the farmer is fairness concerns or not, the optimal 
order price will decrease with the increasing of the degree 
of the risk-aversion. In the other words, the more caring 
about the risk, the company will enhance the order price 
to encourage the farmer to performance positively
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Figure 1 
Effect of the Degree of Risk-Averse η on Order Price 
ω*i 
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Figure 2 
Effect of the Degree of Fairness Concerns λ on Order 
Price ω*i
From Figure 2, when the degree of the risk-averse for 
farmer η=0.8, the optimal contract price ω*u will increase 
12Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
The Optimal Decisions of the “Company + Farmer” Contract-
Farming Supply Chain With Nash Bargain Fair Reference
with the increase of the degree of the farmer’s fairness 
concerns. Meanwhile, when we don’t consider the 
farmer’s fairness concerns, the optimal contract price ω*d 
is equal to the optimal contract price ω*u with λ=0.3. It can 
clearly be seen that we can’t exclude the farmer’s fairness 
concerns thoroughly actually.
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Figure 3 
Effect of the degree of Risk-Averse η on the Number of 
Agricultural Input Q*i
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Figure 4 
Effect of the Degree of Fairness Concerns λ on the 
Number of Agricultural Input Q*i
From Figure 3, we can observe that the farmer’s 
optimal number of agricultural input Q*i will be increasing 
with the increasing of the degree of the farmer’s risk-
averse. Meanwhile, when the degree of the farmer’s risk-
averse η is lower than some value, the farmer with fairness 
concerns will enhance the optimal number of agricultural 
input to gain the more fair profit distribution. While when 
the degree of the farmer’s risk-averse is higher than some 
value, the farmer will decrease the optimal number of 
agricultural input.
From Figure 4, we can observe that the optimal 
number of agricultural input Q*i will be increasing with 
the increasing of the degree of the farmer’s fairness 
concerns λ. When we don’t consider the farmer’s fairness 
concerns, the optimal number of agricultural input Q*d 
is equal to Q*u when the degree of the farmer’s fairness 
concerns is equal to some value.
CONCLUSION
According to the characters of the contract-farming supply 
chain, we model and analysis the contract-farming supply 
chain consist of a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral 
company, and then we get the conclusion as follow:
(a) In the framework of consultations Nash fair, the 
contract-farming supply chain consisting of a farmer with 
fairness concerns and a fair-neutral company can be able 
to achieve the equilibrium solution through Stackelberg 
bargain game. 
(b) The farmer’s fairness concern will force the 
company to enhance the order price to achieve the relative 
fair profit for the farmer. The more caring about the risk, 
the company will enhance the order price to encourage the 
farmer to performance positively. 
(c) The farmer’s optimal number of agricultural input 
Q*i will be increasing with the increasing of the degree of 
the farmer’s risk-averse. Meanwhile, when the degree of 
the farmer’s risk-averse η is lower than some value, the 
farmer with fairness concerns will enhance the optimal 
number of agricultural input to gain the more fair profit 
distribution. While when the degree of the farmer’s risk-
averse is higher than some value, the farmer will decrease 
the optimal number of agricultural input.
(d) The optimal number of agricultural input Q*i will 
be increasing with the increasing of the degree of the 
farmer’s fairness concerns λ. When we don’t consider 
the farmer’s fairness concerns, the optimal number of 
agricultural input Q*d is equal to Q
*
u when the degree of 
the farmer’s fairness concerns is equal to some value.
We get the significant conclusion through studying 
the contract-farming supply chain consisting of a risk-
averse farmer and a risk-neutral company under fairness 
concerns. Future research directions include: (a) How 
will the optimal decision change when the company is 
also fairness concerns? (b) In this paper, we consider 
only a company and a farmer, while the contract-farming 
supply chain is very complex actually, we can study the 
contract-farming supply chain consisting of more than one 
company and more than one farmer. 
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